Best TruStories of the Week - #11


Claim: The Tokyo 2020 Olympics will be eco-friendly, making the medals from recycled materials.

Source: Newsweek

Category: Sports / Sustainability

My Stake: 50 TruStake, backing

My Evidence:

Background: In the past, Olympic medals were made from real metal. Since 1912, Olympic medals have not been made with solid gold (Source). This is why Olympians historically “bit” into their medals when they received them to discern whether they were made from real gold. Human teeth are stronger than gold, so biting into solid gold would leave an indention. Olympic medals are now made with only 1.34% real gold with the other components being Sterling Silver (Source).

For the Rio 2016 Olympics, each gold medal had 6 grams of gold (Source). Every 35 - 40 recycled cell phones have about 1 gram of gold (Source). Meaning each gold medal requires approximately 225 cell phones (using average 37.5 cell phones/per gram of gold) recycled. With 812 gold medals minted for the Rio Olympics, Tokyo 2020 will need roughly 182,700 cell phones recycled to have sufficient gold for the medals! Urban mining initiatives by the Japanese government in 2009 recycled 567,000 used cell phones in 3 months (Source)!

I’d like to think that something as special as the Olympics, the Japanese will rise and recycle to the occasion. :jp::iphone::medal_sports::recycle:


Claim: Fortnite made $3 billion in revenue in 2018.

Category: Video Games

My Stake : 50 TruStake, backing



According to this article from Lendedu 68.8% of the player spends $84.67. We can safely say the other 31.2% spent $0 which averages to about $58.25.

According to statista 200 million accounts, not all accounts are active. Scamming is unfortunately rampant in Fortnite which render many of these accounts inactive.

Fortnite had approximately 78.3 million active players in August 2018 according to Polygon. If the average of all accounts spent to this date equates to $58.25 per account then the projected revenue would be (number of active accounts) * (average spent). Therefore the revenue based on this information alone is $4.5 billion. This doesn’t take into account previous months where the active player count was much lower and assumes an average account spending of $58.25 for all accounts. With this information we can safely conclude Epic Games did at least break the $3 billion mark they’ve claimed.


Claim: The function burnReturn() in Moolyacoin’s smart contract can steal your tokens.

Category: ICO

Source: YouTube video by Bitboy Crypto

My Stake: Back claim by 100 Cred

My Argument/Evidence:

The Backstory

BitBoy Crypto was paid to do an ICO review on Moolyacoin. The agreed upon payment was 50,000 tokens; BitBoy received 833,333 instead of 50,000. In this video, BitBoy shows a confirmed transaction of 833,333 tokens and a second for 50,000 tokens, in his wallet.

After the second transaction, the total amount in BitBoy’s wallet from Moolyacoin was 50,000 tokens. The tokens transferred by mistake, somehow, were recalled by Moolyacoin. BitBoy doesn’t mention the company’s name in the video, but leaves enough data and clues for viewers to investigate the aforementioned series of events, including the snippet of code from Moolycoin’s smart contact that contains a function named burnReturn().

Bitboy decided to rescind his offer to complete the ICO review and even pay the gas cost to return the 50,000 tokens. Bitboy mentioned this situation to a friend, Keith. In turn, Keith not only reviewed Moolyacoin’s smart contact, he wrote a Medium article on his findings. I found the article and read it several times.

Keith Mukai is a Python/DApp Developer and creator of In his Medium article the function burnReturn(function) is explained line-for-line.

The Evidence

The code in the screen capture below, is from lines 369 - 376 of Moolyacoin’s smart contract on Etherscan which is the same code that BitBoy Crypto displayed in his video.

Line Number(s) Code Explanation
369 The function takes as inputs an Ethereum address _addr and an integer _value. And even though this is a public function, it has an access modifier onlyOwner. This means that only the contract owner has permission to execute the function
370 & 371 Require calls checking to make sure that the address provided isn’t a blank address
372 Subtracts _value number of MOOLYA tokens from the provided address’ balance. The contract owner is literally taking _addr’s tokens away.
373 The subtracted tokens from line 372 are added to msg.sender’s balance. Someone else gets _addr’s MOOLYA! Who is the msg.sender? It’s the address that called burnReturn. And the only person who can call that function is the contract owner.

Keith’s explaining of function burnReturn() is void of errors. After double-checking Keith’s assessment, I reviewed Moolyacoin’s smart contact in its entirety (386 lines of code).
I’ll refrain from mentioning all of my finding as they are beyond the scope of this post and I want to avoid making swift assumptions. However, there’s something I noticed while reading the contract that I found curious.

Lines 1 - 342 are paired with detailed comments; the code on lines 342 - 386 for the following functions, are not commented:

  • mintable()
  • burnReturn()
  • burnDead()

It’s important to note that functions burnReturn() and burn() aren’t synonymous.



does this ICO have a website?


@hieu one caveat to note is that this estimated figure is based on a survey of of 1,000 Fortnite gamers. I wonder if there’s another source we can cross reference this with?

thanks for digging into this, btw :slight_smile:


good point. I’ll jump in and challenge the claim too.


Yes, I just put it as a hyperlink in the claim:


Wow. Their website looks like a whole load of crap:

moolya uses time-tested concepts of clusters, chapters and subchapters, digital offices, service cards, avatars, business processes and workflows to emulate the offline models of a startup ecosystem, to offer a unified digital platform built on blockchain and smart contracts for building global trust.


And they have reached their soft cap of of 3mUSD thus far. The more one investigates, the more questions arise. I honestly wanted to find a mistakes in my research, but it is what it is.


Claim: Modi went to bed at 04:30 am IST yesterday after the last pilot of the squad that entered Pakistan’ air space returned home"

Category: War, Politics

Source: Nation with NaMo facebook page (political page for NaMo, rebrand from Citizens for Accountable Governance, unverified source of rebrand)

My Stake: Challenge (100 TS)

My Argument / Evidence: Two pilots flying a MiG were shot down by Pakistan air force for entering without notice Pakistani airspace. One of which was caught by the Pakistani army after his aircraft crashed in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (source: BBC - UK, NDTV - INDIA, The Express Tribune - PAKISTAN, Al-Jazeera - QATAR)
Therefore Modi could not have “slept after the last pilot had returned home” since a couple never came home.


Good catch. Thanks. I see no reason to not Challenge this claim.


My Stake: Support (60 CRED)

In the following I’ll explain why I don’t support with higher CRED, nor do I support the reasoning give by @cthepot.

Let’s go through the order of events and understand what this post if referring to.

  • India carried out attacks across the Line of Control (LOC) at 3:30 AM, on 26th Feb (Tuesday). Source

  • The FB post was posted on 26th Feb, 9:41 PM. So, when the post talks about Mr. Modi not having slept, it would be talking of 26th Feb, 4:30 AM.

  • That means, Mr. Modi was awake when the mission took place on 3:30 AM in the morning, and slept when all pilots had returned from the mission. Also, no news coverage of that period talks of any missing pilots, so we can safely assume the pilots returned safely.

  • I cannot back it with higher CRED as there is no way to prove Mr. Modi was awake till 4:30 AM.

Now, coming to @cthepot’s answer.
The BBC and other articles mentioned refer to the counter-strike Pakistan did on 27th Feb (Wednesday). To counter Pakistan’s attack, certain Indian aircrafts followed them across the LOC and the pilots were captured on 27th Feb (Wednesday). So, this refers to an event after the FB post was posted.

Hope this clears up everything :slight_smile:


Brilliant find. Really feel there is a strong need for Smart-contract validators in the crypto space now.


Claim: EOS is not Byzantine Fault Tolerant.

Category: Blockchain


My Stake: Back claim (100 CRED)


Definition by Wikipedia:
Byzantine Fault: It is a condition of a computer system, particularly distributed computing systems, where components may fail and there is imperfect information on whether a component has failed.

According to BreakerMag 2 million EOS were stolen because one of the 21 Block Producers did not manage their blacklist addresses. So, there is imperfect information, and EOS is not able to handle that. This goes against the premise of being BFT.


Claim : The Avalanche paper does not explain how the protocol will resist Sybil attacks

Category : Consensus Protocols

Source :

My Stake : Back with 100 Cred

My Argument/Evidence :


Only reference in the paper to Sybil attacks is in reference to Algorand under Related Work “Sybils are an orthogonal issue”


Damn. I Challenged it too soon. Now that there’s new evidence in terms of the date discrepancy, I’d like to back it as well.


Thanks. I agree. Someone needs to come out with a company called “Crypto Smart Contract Validators”

Tagline: Where we investigate your code line for line…


How easy is it to change the smart-contract code? If it is possible for the developers, then you can copy the existing code, and upload it on IPFS to catch them even if they make changes to the uploaded code. Tron was caught that way.


Developers can add customized code to a smart contact. Solidity is an interesting language. In my opinion, it’s fairly easy to make costly errors. I personally think several experienced human eyes should view the code before it’s deployed.


@Astra-Rai @ankit

This already exists. There are auditing services for smart contracts (e.g. Open Zepplin is one example of a company that does this). The reputable teams in the space do extensive auditing of their smart contracts to make sure there aren’t any security holes.

The problem not that there aren’t code auditors. The problem is that there is no standards and requirements. So it’s free will in terms of whether a team decides to audit their code or not. Therefore, the responsibility is on the user to only invest in teams they trust will do these audits. Which is unfortunate.